
Are Record IPOs Behind India's Stagnant Secondary Stock Market?
India's indices have gone sideways while IPOs raise record sums. The same domestic money pays for both. Early backers and bankers profit, while late buyers in the unlisted market pay peak prices and take the losses.
The Gist
India's stock market is experiencing a paradox of stagnant indices and a booming IPO market.
- In FY26, 219 companies listed, raising a record Rs 1.8 lakh crore.
- Domestic investors, particularly through mutual funds, are absorbing foreign selling, leading to a busy IPO calendar.
- Despite high oversubscription rates, many IPOs face challenges post-listing, with a significant number trading below their issue prices.
India's stock market has spent the better part of two years going sideways. The market for new shares, meanwhile, has rarely been busier.
In FY26, 219 companies listed on Indian exchanges, raising a record Rs 1.8 lakh crore. In the first nine months of calendar 2026, 84 companies raised about Rs 1.10 lakh crore through mainboard IPOs, according to Prime Database figures.
September was the busiest month of the year, with a record 34 issues raising Rs 39,380 crore, more than half of it from the National Stock Exchange's own listing.
April to September was the strongest half-year on record at Rs 94,205 crore, and listing-day gains in those six months averaged 19%, against 7% a year earlier. Through August, institutions bid for IPO shares an average of 76 times over, according to Prime Database
The largest issue of all closed was Jio Platforms. The telecom and digital arm of Reliance Industries raised Rs 30,213 crore at Rs 1,119 a share, India's biggest IPO. Institutions bid for 67 times the shares set aside for them, while retail investors applied for less than three times their quota.
At listing on Wednesday, the company reached a valuation of almost Rs 13.05 lakh crore or $137 billion, with shares valued at Rs 1,417.50 on the NSE and at Rs 1417.35 on the BSE at closing on Wednesday.
The Nifty meanwhile has fallen about 14% this year. So how does a market that cannot lift its benchmark index manage to absorb record quantities of new paper?
Many investors see a contradiction here. But the two facts might be closely linked through cause-and-effect.
The flat index and the busy IPO calendar are being fed from the same pool of money, and understanding that pool explains both.
The Same Money Pays For Both
Let's start with a simple point that gets lost in the excitement.
Every rupee that goes into an IPO is a rupee that did not go into shares already listed. Most of the money raised in these issues comes from offers for sale, 61% of FY26 mainboard IPO proceeds by Grant Thornton Bharat's count, which means existing shareholders such as private equity funds, venture capitalists and promoters are cashing out, rather than the company raising fresh capital.
Jio Platforms sold only new shares, but Rs 27,500 crore of its proceeds will repay borrowings at its telecom subsidiary, Reliance Jio Infocomm. Whether the shares are new or old, the buyers' money comes from the same pool.
The IPOs are also only part of the supply.
Listed companies raised another Rs 2.4 lakh crore in FY26 through preferential allotments, qualified institutional placements and rights issues. The pace has picked up since. In July and August 2026 alone, IPOs, QIPs and promoter offers for sale through the exchanges raised more than Rs 1.11 lakh crore. Add block deals, and the market has had to digest an enormous amount of new stock.
Now look at who is buying. Foreign portfolio investors have been heavy sellers of Indian equities for much of this period. Between January and October 12 this year, they sold a net Rs 3,.64 lakh crore of listed shares, even as they put Rs 56,485 crore into IPOs.
The slack has been taken up by domestic money, chiefly the monthly SIP flows into mutual funds. SIPs brought in a record Rs 32,490 crore in September alone; domestic institutions as a whole bought a net Rs 6.83 lakh crore of shares this year to mid-October.
That covers the foreign selling with about Rs 3.2 lakh crore to spare, and the remainder is what the year's IPOs, QIPs and promoter sales have had to draw on. This money is, in a sense, captive. Indian savers face limits on how much they can invest abroad, and mutual funds face caps on overseas holdings. So it stays at home and has to be deployed somewhere.
Fund managers staring at a familiar index whose earnings have slowed, find IPOs attractive. They get anchor allocations, and they get access to businesses the Nifty barely covers, from asset managers and exchanges to consumer internet platforms.
Scarcity sells. The direct sums are smaller than the attention suggests. Mutual funds put Rs 12,944 crore into mainboard IPOs in the first eight months of 2026, according to Business Standard data, against net equity purchases of about Rs 6.4 lakh crore in FY26, according to SEBI's annual report.
Their weight shows in the order books instead. In FY26, they were the largest anchor investors for the first time, with 14.89% of issue amounts, according to Prime Database.
The squeeze on listed shares comes at the margin, in the weeks when a big issue draws cash that would otherwise have bid for them. Put the two sides together, and the picture becomes clearer.
Domestic flows have been large enough to absorb foreign selling and a flood of new paper. They have not been large enough to do that and push prices higher as well. A sideways Nifty is what that balance looks like.
Supply is only part of the explanation, and probably not the larger part. Nifty earnings grew just 5% in FY26, a second straight year of single-digit growth, according to Motilal Oswal's review, and the index's trailing P/E had slipped below 20 by March. Slower profits explain why the index stopped rising.
The new paper helps explain why it has not recovered as valuations cheapened — the domestic money that would have bought the dip keeps being called into new issues.
That raises the question of who is collecting it.
Who Is Making Money From The Boom
Whether the boom pays depends on when you came in.
Early backers are doing well. Founders, angel investors and venture funds that bought in at Series A or B, and private equity funds that entered mid-sized companies years ago, are exiting at large multiples of their cost.
Jio Platforms' 2020 investors, led by Meta and Google, came in at an equity value of Rs 4.91 lakh crore. Its IPO price values the company at about Rs 10 lakh crore, roughly twice that, although none of them sold shares in this issue.
For a dollar fund, some of that gain disappears into a weaker rupee over a seven- to ten-year holding period, but the IPO remains the best exit available.
Late-stage investors who paid up in the 2021–22 funding boom have had a harder time. Several companies have come to market at or below the valuations of their last private rounds. For these funds, the listing is less a triumph than a way to recover capital.
The one group that makes money on every IPO is the bankers who run it. Their fee depends on the deal closing, not on how the stock does afterwards, and the syndicates have grown crowded. The ICICI Prudential AMC offer had 17 book-running lead managers, all carrying the same title under a 2021 SEBI rule, so outsiders have no way of knowing who did the work. Jio Platforms used 19.
Everyone around that table has a reason to keep the others happy. The bankers' most valuable repeat clients are the private equity funds selling in the offer for sale, so the pressure runs towards a price that pleases the seller. Academic work on Indian IPOs has raised exactly this worry, that a discretionary allotment can serve as a reward for continuing business rather than for any information the investor brings.
Sometimes the bankers and the anchors belong to the same houses. The Indo-MIM IPO in July was run by HDFC Bank, Axis Capital, ICICI Securities, Kotak Mahindra Capital and SBI Capital Markets. Its anchor list included mutual funds from all five groups.
The ICICI Prudential, HDFC, SBI and Kotak fund houses each took almost exactly Rs 60 crore, spread across four to seven schemes, while Axis Mutual Fund took Rs 35 crore across eight. Add the groups' insurers, namely ICICI Prudential Life, ICICI Lombard, HDFC Life, SBI Life and Axis Max Life (in which Axis Bank holds a minority stake), plus an offshore Kotak fund, and entities from the five banking groups took about Rs 360 crore of the Rs 1,141 crore anchor book, close to a third. Indo-MIM closed its first day of trading 53% above the issue price, so the anchors did well.
Jio's anchor book followed the same pattern on a larger scale. Of the Rs 8,110 crore placed with 212 anchors on October 19, the fund houses of SBI, HDFC and ICICI Prudential took about Rs 425 crore each, Kotak Rs 200 crore, Axis Rs 50 crore and JM Financial Rs 10 crore, according to INDmoney's tally. All six groups were among the issue's lead managers. Together they took Rs 1,535 crore, nearly a fifth of the anchor book, before counting the groups' insurers and pension funds, which also bid.
None of this breaks the rules, which bar the lead managers themselves but let mutual funds, insurers and foreign funds sponsored by their group companies bid as anchors. An anchor list is supposed to signal independent institutional confidence, but at Indo-MIM nearly a third, and at Jio nearly a fifth, of that confidence came from the groups being paid to sell the issue. SEBI's 2025 amendments point the same way. They raised the anchor portion to 40% of the institutional book and reserved most of it for mutual funds, which gives the banks' sister fund houses a larger guaranteed place.
The pattern is an old one. An early study of Indian anchor IPOs found at least one anchor from the lead manager's own group in about a tenth of issues. The same research hinted at what such ties do to the price. IPOs with a same-group anchor rose 3.4% on their first day, against 6.2% for those without, according to a report on the 2013 draft. A smaller first-day pop means less money left on the table, which suits the selling shareholders, the bankers' repeat clients. The authors found no sign that banks steered allocations to their own funds, and the sample was small, so the effect remains a worry rather than a proven finding.
The anchors, for their part, do not stay long. A SEBI review of 242 mainboard IPOs listed between April 2022 and October 2025 found that about half the original anchor allocation had been sold within a year, with foreign investors exiting 60% of theirs and mutual funds 38%.
Retail investors who read the anchor list as a vote of confidence were buying into positions the anchors planned to trim. The selling also moved prices.
Where anchors sold heavily in the first month, the shares fell by an average of about 3.5% over that month, against roughly 0.4% where they held on, the August study found. The worst placed are the retail and wealthy investors who bought shares in the unlisted market, hoping to get in before the crowd. HDB Financial Services traded at around Rs 1,250 off-market, but its IPO was priced at Rs 740.
Tata Capital's unlisted shares touched Rs 1,125 at their peak, against an IPO band of Rs 310–326. Zepto's unlisted shares fell nearly 60% from their December 2025 high after the company paused its IPO. These buyers also face a six-month lock-in after listing, so they cannot even sell into a listing-day pop.
So why do buyers keep coming back, issue after issue?
Part of the answer is that the wins are visible and the losses are not.
Early buyers of Groww or long-standing holders of NSE's unlisted shares get talked about in broker pitches and WhatsApp groups, while those nursing losses keep quiet. After the 2020–24 bull run, when many pre-IPO bets paid off, investors are still acting on recent experience.
The losses are also easy to miss. Unlisted shares have no daily quote on a screen, so a buyer learns the damage only when the IPO band is announced.
By then the next hot name is being pitched. The people doing the pitching, from unlisted-share dealers to wealth platforms, earn their spread whether the client wins or loses. When a popular IPO is heavily oversubscribed, a retail application usually comes to nothing, which makes the unlisted route look like the only way in.
Then there is the supply of new buyers. With demat accounts multiplying, every year brings a fresh group of affluent first-timers who have not yet been burnt. The market does not need the same people to return. It only needs new ones to arrive.
Timing matters here. Those who bought unlisted shares years before a listing, at sensible valuations, can still do well. The damage falls mostly on those who buy in the months just before an IPO, when the hype and the price both peak. That, unfortunately, is when most new money turns up.
There is an old Wall Street line about what happens when a man with money meets a man with experience. The man with experience ends up with the money, and the man with money ends up with experience. India's unlisted market has been handing out a great deal of experience.
Read The Subscription Numbers As A Trade
What should an ordinary investor take from this?
First, oversubscription numbers measure allotment arithmetic more than conviction. When everyone expects to be scaled back, they apply for far more shares than they want, and wealthy investors often borrow to do so. Jio's institutional book was 67 times covered last week, against less than three times for retail.
A 70-times book shows a dependable listing-day trade, but it says little about where the stock will be in three years. Almost 30% of Indian IPOs between 2023 and 2025 listed below their issue price, according to one tally.
Second, IPO timing is set by sellers. Promoters and funds bring companies to market when they think the price is right for them, which is rarely the moment when it is right for the buyer.
None of this means every IPO is a bad bet. Some will turn out to be very good businesses bought at fair prices. But the busy IPO calendar is best read as a measure of how confident sellers feel, rather than as a sign of a healthy bull market.
Dev Chandrasekhar advises corporations on multi-stakeholder narratives related to markets, valuation, governance, and doing-by-design.

