Grounded Aircraft, Lost Revenues: Engine Repair Woes Disrupting Indian Aviation
Indian airlines are surviving the crisis through wet leases, compensation deals, and fleet shifts — but long-term fixes remain elusive.
India’s airlines are getting global attention with their massive aircraft orders. IndiGo, on June 1, 2025, doubled its widebody Airbus A350 order to 60 aircraft by converting a part of its purchase rights into a firm order. In April 2024, the airline had placed its first-ever order for 30 A350s, along with purchase rights for 70 more.
Despite this, the aviation industry is struggling with a more grounded problem — literally. Hundreds of aircraft are sitting idle, awaiting engine repairs that just aren't coming fast enough.
According to rating agency ICRA’s recent report, as of January 30, 2025, InterGlobe Aviation Ltd (IndiGo) had about 60 to 70 aircraft grounded, largely due to ongoing issues with Pratt & Whitney engines, particularly the contamination of powder metal used in critical engine components.
By March 2025, the total number of grounded aircraft across key Indian airlines reached 133, accounting for roughly 16% of the industry's overall fleet.
This capacity crunch has put pressure on available seat kilometres (ASKMs), a key metric for industry capacity. Still, the situation marks a slight improvement from September 30, 2023, when 154 aircraft were out of service.
At the heart of the issue lies a global bottleneck in engine maintenance, particularly involving Pratt & Whitney engines. These engines, powering many of the Airbus A320neos flown by Indian carriers, are failing far sooner than expected, and the repair turnaround is painfully slow.
The consequences? Operational disruptions, grounded aircraft, lost revenue.
Resorting To Wet Leasing
So, how are Indian airlines keeping their businesses aloft despite grounded aircraft?
The most common stop-gap measure is wet leasing — borrowing aircraft, along with crew and maintenance, from foreign carriers.
“Because of the aircraft shortage, the airlines are stuck with wet leasing as a better option,” Bharat Malkani, chairman at Max Aerospace and Aviation, told The Core.
IndiGo, for instance, has brought in aircraft on wet lease from European companies to maintain flight schedules.
“IndiGo had Airbus deliveries coming in on schedule, and they supplemented that by wet leasing and even dry leasing aircraft. They’re trying to balance their grounded capacity by bringing in aircraft from wherever they can,” C.S. Tomar, aviation expert, told The Core.
It’s not just IndiGo that is feeling the heat — Air India has also made headlines recently due to an in-flight engine failure.
On January 5, a Delhi-bound Air India flight was forced to make an emergency landing after one of its engines shut down midair. According to The Hindu, the aircraft circled over Bengaluru for nearly an hour before safely returning to the airport.
Strategy Change
Airlines are also quietly pivoting their strategy to cope with the problem.
After repeated issues with Pratt & Whitney’s geared turbofan engines, IndiGo began transitioning its fleet to CFM International’s LEAP engines.
It’s not an overnight fix, but the airline is slowly phasing out troubled engines in favour of more reliable alternatives—one aircraft at a time.
“This is part and parcel of running a 300+ aircraft airline. Not every aircraft will be serviceable at the same time. We are in talks with OEMs for compensation, and as and when repair engines arrive, we install them and return aircraft to service,” an IndiGo aircraft maintenance engineer told The Core on condition of anonymity.
While this sounds proactive, insiders suggest it’s more of a juggle than a solution. Wet leasing is expensive, regulatory-heavy, and not sustainable in the long run.
It might be helping airlines maintain operations, but it’s not solving the core issue.
More Than Just Technical Glitches
According to an April report by rating agency ICRA, supply chain constraints and engine-related issues — especially with P&W engines — have significantly dented Indian carriers’ operational capacities.
The report noted that Go First (formerly GoAir) was among the hardest hit, grounding nearly half its fleet in FY24. The company was ultimately ordered to liquidate by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in January 2025.
But this is not solely a P&W problem. The IndiGo engineer points out that engine suppliers like CFM International (maker of the LEAP engines) are also battling supply chain crises.
“The Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted access to rare earth metals like nickel and titanium, which are vital for engine manufacturing. Add to that the Israel-Palestine tensions and the emerging Pakistan conflict, and you've got a full-blown global supply chain meltdown,” the engineer added.
How Many Planes Are Affected?
Go First’s collapse is a cautionary tale of what can go wrong when airlines don’t lock in protections in their engine contracts.
Like IndiGo, the airline began flying Airbus A320neos powered by the problematic Pratt & Whitney 1100 series engines — but unlike its rival, Go First lacked the contractual safety nets that could have softened the blow.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, operations were down, and the issues were masked. But post-pandemic, the supply chain had collapsed. The combustion chamber in the P&W engine needs a specific nickel sourced from Ukraine. Once that stopped, P&W simply couldn’t deliver.
“While IndiGo quickly pivoted to CFM Leap engines after in-flight shutdown incidents, Go First stuck with P&W, lured by compensation offers,” an ex-Go First aircraft maintenance engineer told The Core on condition of anonymity.
As a result, by the end, Go First had a fleet of 65 aircraft but was operating only 25. Unlike IndiGo, the airline didn’t have contractual safety nets for engine performance failures.
“IndiGo had contracts where engine failure would trigger monetary compensation. Go First didn’t. That’s an acute difference,” the engineer said.
The P&W engines were initially expected to stay on-wing for 6,000 to 8,000 flight hours. Instead, some began failing in as little as 1,000 to 2,000 flight hours.
As per the engineer, around 2020, because of the recurring engine issues, the DGCA recommended that airlines switch their orders from Pratt & Whitney to CFM LEAP engines.
“IndiGo took that seriously. At the time, they had around 100 aircraft powered by Pratt & Whitney engines, and for the rest, maybe another 200 in the pipeline, they changed their order to CFM LEAP. Go First, on the other hand, didn’t. Pratt & Whitney was offering them compensation, so they were somewhat comfortable and didn’t push for a switch,” the Go First engineer added.
Is Supply Chain The Only Problem?
While engine OEMs and global conflicts are easy scapegoats, experts argue the root cause runs deeper — India’s lack of domestic maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities.
“Only 15% of the MRO work for Indian carriers happens within India. The rest is outsourced. That means every hiccup abroad—wars, airspace closures, or logistic delays—hits us hard. Until India builds its own engine repair ecosystem, these will continue to be 'supply chain problems, ” Malkani said.
The Core previously reported on the various challenges that the Indian MRO sector encounters, including difficulties in securing investments, inadequate infrastructure and high taxes, among others.
There’s also a regulatory hangover. For years, outdated rules meant import duties were lower than local production costs, making it economically unviable for airlines to use Indian MROs.
“It’s only since last year that these rules were amended, but Indian MROs still lack the scale and technology,” Malkani added.
Why Doesn’t India Have Engine Shops Yet?
India’s glaring absence of engine repair shops is a legacy of neglected policymaking.
“Countries like Singapore, Poland, and even Switzerland have world-class engine repair shops, but India doesn’t. That’s astonishing,” the IndiGo engineer said.
The reasons range from a lack of political interest to poor industrial planning.
“It takes months to ship unserviceable engines abroad and get them back. Some repairs take four months. That’s just not sustainable for a growing aviation market,” he added.
A Ray of Hope in Hyderabad
There’s one bright spot on the horizon. French engine manufacturer Safran is setting up an engine MRO facility in Hyderabad’s SEZ. Set to begin operations by the end of this year, it is projected to be one of the largest such facilities globally — larger even than Safran’s Morocco facility.
“This is a step in the right direction. It will bring some of the offshore workload back to India and save precious foreign exchange. But it’s not a silver bullet. One MRO shop won’t fix the capacity shortfall overnight,” the IndiGo engineer added.
What’s the Long-Term Fix?
For now, airlines are limping along — leasing aircraft, juggling engine swaps, negotiating compensation, and adjusting delivery schedules. But these are band-aid solutions.
IndiGo, which has more than 1,000 aircraft on order, is looking to exit the P&W mess entirely.
“They have a large number of aircraft on order, and within the next 18 months, all aircraft with Pratt engines will be phased out. That will leave them with a stable, uniform fleet powered entirely by CFM’s LEAP engines—that’s the long-term plan,” Tomar said.
Still, the airlines alone can’t solve what is essentially a national infrastructure problem.
“Airlines are focused on getting passengers from point A to point B. They’re not in the business of fixing engines. That’s where the government has to step in,” Tomar said.
It appears the government is slowly waking up to the challenge. Incentives are being rolled out to attract OEMs to set up shops in India. The push for strategic autonomy, particularly after Russia-Ukraine disruptions, has added urgency.
“Until we build a robust domestic MRO industry, we’re going to remain vulnerable. The Hyderabad facility is a good start. But we need more—many more,” the Indigo engineer added.
Indian airlines are managing to stay afloat with wet leases, engine swaps, and future fleet adjustments. But none of these strategies offer a long-term solution to the fundamental weakness in India’s aviation ecosystem: its dependence on foreign MROs and fragile global supply chains.
Until India strengthens its local engine repair capabilities, the country’s aviation dreams will continue to be at the mercy of international turbulence — no matter how many aircraft are on order.
